There's a particular kind of knowledge that disappears not
because it's wrong but because the conditions that produced
it no longer exist. The pre-internet world — and I mean the
actual texture of daily life before always-on connectivity —
is becoming that kind of knowledge. Not because the people
who lived through it are dying off, though they are. Because
the experiences themselves are structurally incompatible with
how life works now. You can't stream what it felt like to not
know something and have no immediate way to find out.
Friction was the defining feature, though nobody called it
that at the time. Information took effort. You went to a
library, or you asked someone who might know, or you simply
didn't find out. Communication had latency built in — you
wrote a letter, waited days, received a reply that might or
might not address what you'd asked. Choices were constrained
by geography, opening hours, physical stock. None of this
felt romantic while it was happening. It felt normal. The
constraints were invisible in the way that water is invisible
to fish.
What those constraints trained was a particular kind of
cognitive stamina. When finding information costs time and
effort, you develop a relationship with the information you
do find. You hold it longer because acquiring it required
investment. You synthesise rather than accumulate, because
accumulation is expensive. You commit to decisions because
reversing them means repeating the friction. Research
published in
Frontiers in Public Health
found that intensive internet search behaviour measurably
affects how we encode and retain information — when we know
Google will remember for us, we let it, and something in
the cognitive chain softens.
I'm not sure "softens" is the right word. It's more like a
muscle that adapts to a lighter load. It doesn't atrophy
overnight. It just gradually stops being asked to do what it
once did.
The spatial memory research makes this uncomfortably concrete.
A study in Scientific Reports found that people with greater
lifetime GPS use showed
worse spatial memory
during self-guided navigation, and that the decline was
progressive. The more you outsource, the less you retain.
This isn't generalised anxiety about screens. It's measured
cognitive change in a specific domain, and it maps onto the
broader pattern: navigation, arithmetic, phone numbers,
directions to a friend's house. Each delegation is
individually trivial. Collectively, they represent a
wholesale transfer of embodied competence to external systems.
The social texture was different too, in ways that are harder
to quantify. Relationships were local, bounded, and — this
is the uncomfortable part — more durable partly because
leaving was harder. You couldn't algorithmically replace your
social circle. You couldn't find a new community by searching
for one. You were stuck with the people near you, which meant
you developed tolerance, negotiation, and the particular
skill of maintaining connections with people you didn't
entirely like. I'm not romanticising this. Some of those
constraints were suffocating. But they produced a form of
social resilience that frictionless connection and equally
frictionless disconnection don't replicate. The exit costs
created a kind of civic muscle memory. When you couldn't
easily leave, you learned to stay — imperfectly, sometimes
resentfully, but with a persistence that builds something.
What it builds is hard to name. Continuity, maybe. The
knowledge that not every disagreement requires a door.
There's something related happening with culture, and it
troubles me more than the cognitive stuff. Before global
networks, culture varied sharply by place. Music scenes were
geographically specific. Fashion moved through cities at
different speeds. Slang was regional. You could travel two
hundred miles and encounter genuinely different aesthetic
assumptions. The internet collapsed that distance, and what
rushed in to fill the gap was
algorithmic homogenisation
— platforms optimising for universal palatability, training
data drawn overwhelmingly from dominant cultural archives,
trend cycles that now complete in weeks rather than years.
The result isn't the death of diversity exactly. It's the
flattening of it. Regional difference still exists, but it's
increasingly performed rather than lived.
I've written before about
objects that outlive their context
— the particular unease of encountering something from the
pre-internet era that still functions perfectly but belongs
nowhere. A compact disc, a theatre programme, a paper map.
These objects assumed finitude. They were made for a world
where things ended, where events didn't persist in feeds,
where places could close and stay closed. When I handle them
now, the dissonance isn't aesthetic. It's temporal. They're
evidence of a different relationship with time itself.
That temporal difference matters more than people tend to
acknowledge. Digital platforms compress time into an endless
present. Feeds refresh. History scrolls away. Nothing quite
arrives and nothing quite leaves. The pre-internet experience
of time was linear in a way that sounds banal until you try
to describe what replaced it. Waiting was an experience, not
a failure of the system. Seasons structured cultural
consumption because distribution channels were physical.
Anticipation — real anticipation, the kind that builds over
weeks — required scarcity. When everything is available
immediately, anticipation doesn't intensify. It evaporates.
There was a rhythm to cultural life that physical distribution
imposed whether you wanted it or not. Albums had release
dates that meant something because you couldn't hear them
early. Television programmes aired once, and if you missed
them, you missed them. Books arrived in bookshops and either
found you or didn't. This sounds like deprivation described
from the outside, but from the inside it felt like structure.
Things had their time, and that time was finite.
Nicholas Carr has been making versions of this argument since
The Shallows
in 2010, and his more recent Superbloom extends it into
the social fabric. The concern isn't that the internet is
making us stupider in some crude measurable way. The concern
is that it's restructuring cognition and social behaviour so
thoroughly that we're losing the capacity to notice what's
changed. When the baseline disappears, critique becomes
harder. You need a reference point to identify a shift, and
if nobody remembers the reference point, the shift becomes
invisible.
This is the part that feels urgent to me. Not the nostalgia
— nostalgia is cheap and usually dishonest. The urgent part
is the comparative function. Remembering what pre-internet
life actually felt like — not a golden-age fantasy of it but
the real experience, including the boredom and the
limitations — provides a structural check on the present. It
lets you distinguish between convenience and cognitive cost.
It lets you ask whether frictionless access to everything
has made us richer or just busier. It lets you notice that
memory itself has changed shape,
not through damage but through delegation.
Without that baseline, you get what I'd call passive
inevitability. The assumption that the present is the only
way things could possibly work. That algorithmic curation is
simply how culture operates now. That constant connectivity
is a law of physics rather than a design choice made by
specific companies for specific commercial reasons. Every
system benefits from the erasure of its alternatives, and
the pre-internet world is the most comprehensive alternative
to the digital present that most living people can personally
recall.
None of this is about wanting the old world back. Plenty of
it was terrible. Information gatekeeping was often unjust.
Communication barriers isolated people who needed connection.
Cultural insularity bred ignorance as often as it bred
character. The point isn't that friction was good. The point
is that friction was informative. It taught things — patience,
commitment, tolerance of uncertainty, the ability to sit with
not-knowing — that the frictionless environment doesn't teach
and may be actively unlearning.
I keep coming back to something that probably doesn't belong
in this argument. When I was young, you could be unreachable.
Not dramatically, not by fleeing to a cabin — just by leaving
the house. No one could contact you. No one expected to. The
hours between leaving and returning were genuinely yours in a
way that requires explanation now, which is itself the point.
That availability wasn't a moral obligation. That silence
between people wasn't a crisis. That the default state of a
human being was not "online."
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